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ABSTRACT 
Scholars in the field of supply chain management have started to embrace the idea of simultaneous 
cooperation and competition (“coopetition”) in supplier networks but have mainly looked at coopetition 
from a structural perspective. In this paper, we complement the structural view with a paradox 
perspective to investigate the competitive tensions that evolve when buying firms are trying to engage 
both forces simultaneously in their relations with core suppliers. Our comparative case study of four 
major carmakers reveals different strategies buying firms use to manage coopetition in their supplier 
networks, the responses they trigger from their suppliers, and the resulting paradoxical tensions. Our 
inductive analysis reveals that irrespective of the managing approach chosen, the “coopetition 
capabilities” of the buying firm determines whether negative tension dynamics can be avoided. At the 
core of such coopetition capabilities are “evaluative capabilities” allowing the buyer to provide cost 
improvement suggestions to suppliers for the sake of joint value creation, and to control the division of 
value appropriation through a deeper understanding of the supplier’s cost structures. By highlighting the 
nature of coopetition capabilities as organizational capabilities, we also contribute to paradox research, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent debates on the dark side of buyer-supplier relations (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Fang, 
Chang, & Peng, 2011; Kim & Choi, 2015; Noordhoff, Kyriakopoulos, Moorman, Pauwels, & 
Dellaert, 2011) challenge the positive view on collaboration with suppliers in supply chain 
management theory and practice. These debates highlight the necessity of having both relational 
and transactional mechanisms (Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009) in order to generate value and overcome 
the relational inertia that inhibits partners’ capacity to meet changing market demands (Villena, 
Revilla, & Choi, 2011). This increasingly questions the traditional cooperative-competitive 
dichotomy that is commonly used to describe buyer-supplier relationships (Wu & Choi, 2005; 
Karatzas et al. 2015). This faces buying firms with the paradox when they structure 
relationships to derive the greatest benefit from cooperation and collaboration, while keeping 
the supplier competitive in terms of market price (Terpend et al., 2008: 41).  
Supply chain scholars have started to embrace the idea of simultaneous cooperation and 
competition—coopetition—in supplier networks but have mainly looked at the phenomenon 
from a structural perspective (Choi & Wu, 2009; Pathak et al., 2014; Schmoltzi & Wallenburg, 
2012). By viewing the smallest analytic unit of coopetition in networks—a triadic relationship 
between a buyer and two suppliers—scholars have advanced our understanding of the buying 
firm’s strategic role in orchestrating the degree of coopetition in the network by creating 
structural holes (Pathak et al., 2014), or closing them (Wilhelm, 2011). In this paper, we 
complement the structural network perspective with a paradox perspective (Lewis, 2000; Lewis 
& Smith, 2014), providing an in-depth account of the tensions that evolve from structural 
changes in the composition of the network and how they can be successfully managed by supply 
chain managers.  
A paradox is understood as contradictory yet interrelated elements that seem logical in 
isolation but seem absurd and irrational when they appear simultaneously (Lewis, 2000, p. 760). 
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Two core characteristics describe a paradox: contradictions and interrelatedness (Schad et al., 
2016). Thinking in terms of paradoxes demands that supply chain managers accept and work 
with contradictory elements instead of suppressing one of the elements (Lewis & Smith, 2014; 
Stadtler & Van Wassenhove, 2016). Against this theoretical background and in a multiple-case 
study in the global automotive industry, we explore how buying firms manage the paradox of 
coopetition. We seek an answer to the following question: How do buying firms manage the 
paradox of coopetition in their supplier networks?  
Buying firms can either accept this paradox and create synergies between them, or separate 
the conflicting elements, temporally or spatially (Cameron & Quinn, 1988; Lewis & Smith, 
2014). Our case study suggests that buying firms’ attempts to manage coopetition one way or 
the other triggers responses from their suppliers, which relate, positively or negatively, to 
tension dynamics. Our findings also show that irrespective of the actual strategy chosen by the 
buying firm, specific organizational capabilities, that we term “coopetition capabilities,” are 
important to avoid unproductive conflict and the escalation of competitive tensions. 
Considering these insights, we engage in an iterative theory-building process (Gioia et al., 2013) 
by answering a second research question: Which coopetition capabilities does the buying firm 
need in order to trigger positive responses from suppliers and avoid negative tension dynamics?  
Our study offers two main theoretical contributions: By studying practices of carmakers 
and their suppliers in a dyadic and processual fashion, as responses and counter-responses, we 
complement the structural, buying-firm centric perspective of coopetition taken thus far. 
Furthermore, we specify the concept of “coopetition capabilities” (Bengtsson et al., 2016) for 
buyer-supplier relations. Coopetition capabilities have been defined as the ability of a firm to 
manage competitive tensions in inter-firm collaborations in order to attain and maintain a 
moderate level of tension, regardless of the intensity of the coopetition paradox (Bengtsson et 
al. 2016: 19). So far, this concept has been analysed at the level of individual managers and 
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their ability to “think paradoxically” and embrace contradictions (Smith & Tushman, 2005). 
Thus, by moving beyond this narrow focus, we also contribute to emerging paradox theory by 
shedding light on the role of organization-level capabilities of the buying firm for managing the 
paradox of coopetition.  
In the following, we first summarize current research on coopetition in supply chain 
management, and delineate the paradox perspective with a particular focus on different 
practices of managing coopetition. Then, we introduce our research design and methodology, 
before presenting the empirical findings from the global automotive industry. Finally, we 




Coopetition in buyer-supplier relations  
Traditional supply chain management was based on the belief that maximum competition, 
under the discipline of a free market, would promote a healthy supply base which secures low 
prices and on-time delivery. The focus on open-market negotiations that are heavily based on 
price-competition was eventually replaced by a new paradigm that shifted the focus of 
competition from the dyadic buyer-supplier level to a network of co-operating firms competing 
against other supply chains (Dyer & Hatch, 2006; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Spekman et al.,1998). 
This collaborative paradigm1 is still prevalent in the supply chain management literature today 
(Chen & Paulraj, 2004; Terpend & Krause, 2015); only recently scholars started to shift 
attention to the dangers of over-embedded supplier relations. Among them, Villena et al. (2011) 
revealed an inverted curvilinear relationship between social capital and a buying firm’s 
                                                
1 Note that some authors explicitly differentiate between cooperation and collaboration in order to show the 
evolution of buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., Spekman et al., 1998). In line with the coopetition literature, we 
do not draw such a distinction here and use collaboration and cooperation interchangeably.  
 5 
performance, indicating that too little social capital (i.e., an over-emphasis on competition) and 
too much social capital (i.e., an overemphasis on cooperation and a lack of competitive 
tensions) are both equally detrimental for performance. Their study points to the dangers of 
over-embeddedness that can reduce the buyer’s ability to make objective decisions and lead to 
an increase of supplier opportunism. For example, Nissan’s strong relations with its long-
standing suppliers, once a source of competitive advantage, turned into a disadvantage in the 
1990s. Nissan’s purchasing prices were 20-25% higher than market levels on average (see also 
Stevens et al., 2015).   
Supply chain scholars have thus started to embrace the idea that the parallel existence of 
competition and cooperation is actually desirable to the buyer–supplier relationship (Klein et 
al., 2007; Nair et al., 2011). A simplified depiction of coopetition in supplier networks is the 
triadic relation between one buyer and two suppliers (Choi & Wu, 2009; Pathak et al., 2014). 
From such a structural network perspective, cooperation is understood as the direct link between 
two companies, whereas the absence of a link between two companies suggests competition 
when at least one of the three following conditions are met: (1) the two firms can supply a 
product of equivalent functionality, (2) the firms require similar scarce resources or input, (3) 
the two firms have overlapping and complementary technology such that learning and value 
appropriation incentives exist (Pathak et al., 2014: 255). Competition between two suppliers is 
likely to also affect relations that these suppliers have with the buyer. Thus, a triadic perspective 
sharpens our understanding of competitive tensions in a buyer-supplier dyad that result from its 
embeddedness in a larger network with multiple and overlapping relational linkages (Wilhelm, 
2011; Pathak et al. 2014).  
In the context of automotive supplier networks, this means that suppliers with similar 
technological competences are regularly competing for the development and production of a 
specific part for the same project when the carmaker is following a dual or parallel sourcing 
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strategy (Richardson, 1993; Wu & Choi, 2005). Moreover, the respective existence of either 
latent or no ties (Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012) with a supplier who could win a delivery contract 
can lead to competitive tensions during price negotiations. These tensions will resurface again 
during annual price re-negotiations that have become practice in the automotive industry when 
buyers threaten to use alternative market suppliers.  
It is important, however, that competitive tensions do not escalate, as this might undermine 
the potential for joint value creation. The value creation potential is highest in the early stages 
of the product development process, when carmaker and supplier pool their complementary 
technological capabilities to jointly develop the specifications of the vehicle in a way that 
reduces costs and/or adds further functionalities to the car. As suppliers possess more detailed 
knowledge of their parts, they can formulate functional specifics much more precisely, 
identifying potentials for the standardization and simplification of parts construction for the use 
of alternative materials, and potentials for the parallel usage of a part in other models (“carry-
over-parts”) (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991). A rule of thumb in the industry states that 70% of the 
costs are determined in the pre-development phase. Competitive tensions already surface in this 
earlier stage of the cooperation process but become fiercest when the joint creation of value is 
appropriated by both partners, i.e., at the stage of series production, when economies of scale 
and specialization effect can be fully exploited. In practice, the uncertainty of the division of 
value between buyer and seller often leads to buyers deciding to distribute their business to a 
larger number of suppliers instead of maximizing joint value creation through deep 
relationships with single or few suppliers (Elfenbein & Zenger, 2017).   
 The critical issue here is, thus, to manage buyer-supplier relations so that “(b)oth of the 
contradictory elements of a paradox are accepted and present” (Cameron & Quinn, 1988, p. 2), 
and maximum value can be derived from buyer-supplier relationships, ideally to allow for the 
reciprocity that is considered necessary to maintain long-term interorganizational relations 
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(Sydow et al., 2016). Thus, in line with other researchers, we consider coopetition as desirable 
and paradoxical since the simultaneous focus on cooperation and competition causes conflicts 
and tensions (Terpend et al., 2008; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014; Ritala & Tidström, 2014).  
Managing the paradox of coopetition  
Coopetition and other paradoxes are causing tensions for actors when they try to make sense of 
them. At the same time, tensions are an inherent part of every paradox (Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
Research on organizational paradoxes has resulted in a burgeoning stream of literature (for an 
overview see Schad et al., 2016), from which we distil three premises that constitute our 
paradox perspective. The first premise is that managers should accept rather than deny or 
suppress the contradictory nature of a paradox, and seek to create synergies between the 
paradoxical elements.  
The second premise focuses on managing approaches–or responses–to paradoxes; that is, 
responses are either built on a structural separation of the contradictory elements, or the 
acceptance of the co-existence of these elements and the search for synergies between elements. 
The synergistic approach is the most favored one by paradox researchers but poses high 
requirements for managers in terms of their ability to deal with emotional uncertainties and 
ambivalence (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014). The synergistic approach thus requires managers 
develop a high level of “paradoxical cognitions” (Miron-Spektor et al., 2011; Smith & Tushman, 
2005). The temporal or spatial separation of contradicting elements is also referred to as 
“splitting” (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Jarzabkowski, Le, & Van de Ven, 2013). The 
separation can be functional, spatial and/or temporary and allows managers to deal with 
ambiguities that often cause discomfort. Temporal separation allocates competing demands to 
sequential time periods. Spatial separation implies that opposing demands are structurally 
separated, for example by assigning one team to manage the cooperative aspects of a 
relationship, while another manages the competitive aspects (Bentsson & Kock, 2000). While 
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such splitting approaches might help to avoid or eliminate tension, they can also reduce the 
opportunity to tap into the energizing potential of paradox (Andriopoulos and Lewis 2009, 
Razah-Ullah, 2007). By contrast, a synergistic approach is based on “accepting the paradox and 
learning to live with it” (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989, p. 566). This requires that managers 
recognize that both elements that constitute a paradox are important and thus both need to be 
accommodated (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013). For example, Lüscher and Lewis (2008) unearthed 
how middle managers, in sparring sessions with intervening questioning by the researchers, 
worked collaboratively through paradoxes of organizational change by collectively overcoming 
thinking in dilemmas (e.g., “Should I manage, or should I let my employees manage?”) and 
sought to discover the link between seemingly contradictory elements (e.g., “Create optimal 
conditions for teams so they may become self-managing”). This again requires high cognitive 
capabilities of managers. For example, Bengtsson et al. (2016) discovered that a “coopetition 
capability” of managers moderates the relationship between the coopetition paradox and felt 
tensions. In their view, coopetition capability involves a “coopetition mindset” (Gnyawali & 
Park, 2011) and the cognitive complexity to hold contradictions in mind (Smith & Tushman, 
2005). While these are important individual capabilities to manage coopetition paradoxes, we 
know little about the organizational capabilities that come into play at the formation stage of 
the paradoxical relationship (see also Raza-Ullah & Bengtsson, 2017).  
Our third premise is that a paradox cannot be clearly broken down into antecedent-process-
outcome relationships among core constructs but needs to be studied as a process reflecting 
cyclical dynamics (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2017). A processual perspective also opens up the 
possibilities to study the dynamics between the actions of the involved parties, i.e., the recurrent 
interaction between the buyer’s managing response to the coopetition paradox and the 
responses they trigger from suppliers.  
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 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Given the novelty of our paradox perspective on coopetition in the field of supply chain 
management, we relied on an inductive theory building methodology based on case study 
research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Many operations management 
researchers including Barratt et al. (2011), Ketokivi and Choi (2014), and Meredith (1998) have 
argued for the usefulness of conducting inductive case studies for developing rich 
contextualized explanations about buying firm strategies and organizational behaviours. 
Equally, coopetition researchers have argued for the benefits of case study research to study 
paradoxical relationships (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010; Ritala & Tidström, 2014).  
Sampling and data collection  
In our case study we investigated major carmakers and their networks of first-tier suppliers in 
two of the leading countries of the automobile industry, Germany and Japan. Through a 
theoretical sampling strategy, we tried to identify different carmakers’ approaches with regard 
to the different cells of a 2x2 matrix that depict different scenarios of how cooperation and 
competition are addressed (see Figure 1). Cell 4 depicts the “ideal” situation from a paradox 
perspective but also from the view of most coopetition researchers (e.g., Das & Teng, 2000; 
Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997) as cooperation and competition co-exist to a high degree. At the 
same time, we acknowledge that this constellation is likely to put the highest demands on 
managing paradoxes, and may, thus be difficult to achieve in practice. For this reason, cell 4 is 
depicted with a dotted line.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
We followed a maximum variance sampling logic (Eisenhardt, 1989) and based our case 
selection on major supplier satisfaction rankings, published yearly by Automotive News and 
Planning Perspectives (Snyder, 2006; Planning Perspectives 2007), which reflect suppliers’ 
assessments of their relationships with their customers. Although these surveys are not based 
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on explicit measures of cooperation or competition levels in buyer-supplier relations, they 
include items such as “degree of price pressure” and “level of trust,” which speak indirectly to 
these levels. Thus, we used these rankings mainly as a heuristic to determine how cooperative 
suppliers perceive their relation with a particular carmaker. However, it was difficult to identify 
cases that clearly fall into the C4 or C1 category based on the supplier satisfaction rankings. 
Most carmakers in these countries seem indeed to fall into either the “cooperation-dominant 
coopetition” (C2) or “competition-dominant coopetition” (C3) category. We thus decided to 
sample two carmakers from the two countries for both the C2 (Toyota and BMW) and C3 
(Nissan and Volkswagen) categories, but we expected that Toyota would fall into the C4 cell. 
The Japanese carmaker is often named as an example of a company that purposefully embeds 
paradoxical thinking into its manufacturing strategy (Bowen, Spear, & Kent, 1999; Eisenhardt 
& Westcott, 1988; Osono, Shimizu, & Takeuchi, 2008), and we assumed that this would also 
apply to its supplier management style.  
The selection of suppliers was based on two major criteria: (1) suppliers had to develop and 
deliver a strategic part to the carmaker and (2) to have had a long-term relationship with the 
carmaker (> 5 years). Suitable supplier firms were identified through recommendations made 
by the carmakers, member directories of chambers of commerce, existing contacts, and by other 
researchers. The majority of interviewed suppliers are well-known and widely diversified 
companies with an annual turnover of over $4 billion. While these suppliers typically supply 
more than one type of part to a customer, the interview focused only on the particular part for 
which the interviewee was responsible.  
Through our interviews and document analyses, we gathered data on how organizational 
actors deal with the tensions involved in the respective supplier networks for every carmaker 
case. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants from the carmaker as 
well as the first-tier supplier firm. At the carmaker organization, we interviewed managers from 
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the purchasing department in charge of strategic components at both the middle and lower 
management levels. At the supplier organization, we interviewed managers from both the sales 
and product development departments across different hierarchical levels ranging from the 
CEO to key account and project managers. At the time of the interview, the majority of 
respondents were in charge of one particular key account; in eight cases the respondent was in 
charge of two customers. We invited this group of respondents to draw systematic comparisons 
between certain practices and questioned to what extent they thought they were specific to their 
main customer compared to others. Moreover, the majority of respondents had experience with 
other carmakers before their current position and sometimes provided unsolicited comparisons 
between their practices during the interview. 
A structured instrument guided the interviews wherein we asked general questions about 
sourcing and development practices (in two different versions for carmaker and supplier). The 
instrument can be found in the appendix. As each interview progressed, we engaged in probing 
the nature of specific issues and the interviewees responses by asking additional questions. 
Whenever possible, interview partners were asked to provide illustrations of their answers. This 
not only helped us to understand the specific issues at hand and how actors reconstruct and deal 
with them, but also increased the trustworthiness of the data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
All interviews took place on site with interview times ranging from 45 minutes to 3 hours. 
Unclear answers were clarified through email or follow-up questions in subsequent rounds. 
Interviews were conducted in English, German, or Japanese and were audio recorded and 
transcribed afterwards. Main data collection took place within three periods of three months in 
Japan and Germany between 2007 and 2008. A second wave of data collection took place 
between 2011 and 2016 to validate the currency of the data through thirteen additional 
interviews with representatives from buying firm and suppliers for Toyota, Volkswagen, and 
Nissan.  In total, 58 interviews were conducted (see Table 1).  
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Insert Table 1 about here 
The trustworthiness of the data was further ensured by the authors’ prolonged engagement 
with the topic, through studying practitioner-oriented industry journals, attending industry 
meetings, and reviewing previous research in the automobile industry. In addition, multiple data 
sources were used including internal company documents, existing case studies, articles in 
business trade media, and discussions with industry experts such as other researchers and 
consultants (see Appendix for overview on measures that we undertook to address quality 
criteria throughout the research process).  
Data analysis 
In the data analysis stage, we gradually transitioned from an inductive to an abductive approach 
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007) where data and existing theory form a tandem (see also Gioia et 
al., 2013). First, we produced a draft case study report with thick descriptions, which we asked 
nine key informants to review at two different stages. In the subsequent analysis process we 
encoded our data in four steps to move systematically from descriptive data to theoretical 
analysis, while moving between themes emerging from the data and the consultation of existing 
literature (Gioia et al., 2013). 
In the first stage of encoding data, we sought evidence of tensions underlying the 
coopetition paradox by inductively developing codes from the real-life narratives of our 
interviewees. In line with earlier coopetition research (e.g., Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; 
Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Ritala & Tidström, 2014), we focused on the central 
tension underlying the paradox of coopetition in buyer-supplier relations: that between value 
creation and value appropriation. In the context of automotive supplier networks it appeared 
that value creation was often expressed in terms of achieved cost efficiencies through the 
cheaper construction of parts in the product development phase, or through process 
improvements in manufacturing. As purchasing parts are the biggest cost lever for automotive 
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companies, carmakers often send consultants to suppliers’ facilities to improve their production 
costs. However, the often (unequal) appropriation of the jointly created value sometimes caused 
fierce conflicts, surfacing during supplier selection decisions, price (re)negotiations, and the 
enforcement of open book policies on suppliers. We coded these instances as moments of 
competitive tensions.  
In the second encoding stage, we identified carmakers’ approaches to managing these 
tensions and paradoxes by trying to connect the real-life narratives with existing concepts from 
the literature. Here we paid attention to responses that were either aimed at a temporal or spatial 
separation of competitive and cooperative elements in the relation (that we coded as “splitting”) 
and responses that did not aim at such a structural separation but addressed both elements 
simultaneously (that we coded as “acceptance”).  
In the third stage, we identified suppliers’ responses to carmakers’ strategies. As there was 
no previous analysis on dyadic responses to tensions and paradoxes, we generated codes 
inductively at this stage. Finally, we examined the effects of the suppliers’ responses on the 
interorganizational relationships. We looked for carmakers’ and suppliers’ descriptions of the 
quality of the relationships, how they perceive the level of competition in them, and whether 
and how they perceive tensions. We were particularly sensitive to instances where buyers and 
suppliers’ perceptions of the quality of the relationship were diverging, and attempts to initiate 
cooperation were interpreted as competition-inducing ones. Through repeated discussions 
within our research-team, we finally drew implications for the competitive tensions that were 
resulting from the buyer-supplier interaction, in terms of their enforcement (i.e., the relation 
with the carmaker was perceived as competitive despite collaborative efforts), or reduction (i.e., 
suppliers confirmed the collaborative intentions of the carmaker). During this stage, the 
importance of “evaluative capabilities” of the buying firm that emerged was decisive for 
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positively shaping the value creation value-appropriation tension. This insight was interpreted 
and further developed in light of the existing literature on organizational capabilities.  
Interviews conducted in the second wave of data collection were analysed separately in a 
more deductive manner by assigning quotes and text excerpts from the transcripts directly to 
codes developed in the initial data analysis. While the additional analysis did not lead to any 
new insights it helped to corroborate the original analysis by providing additional empirical 
evidence for our observations. 
 
BUYERS’ AND SUPPLIERS’ RESPONSES TO THE COOPETITION PARADOX  
Within-case analysis 
Volkswagen and its supplier network. Volkswagen was most clearly following a temporal 
splitting approach in the collaboration process with suppliers. In the concept phase (about 48 
months before the start of production) the carmaker will usually choose a preferred supplier and 
develop a concept together. After a design freeze there is a “request for quotations,” when 
purchasing will ask a group of alternative suppliers to make their price offers based on 
predefined technical requirements. The price then forms an important basis for the subsequent 
supplier selection decision. The purchasing department (in consultation with development) will 
select one or more suppliers to collaborate in series development to adapt the part to a new 
vehicle model. After start-of-production, however, Volkswagen is again inducing competition 
with the so-called Global Sourcing practice, when asking for price quotations from other 
suppliers for this particular part. Even though an actual change in a supplier is rare, the market 
information is used to exert additional price pressures on existing contracts.  
A main outflow of coopetition in the relationship between Volkswagen and its suppliers is 
the fight for profit margins, reflecting tensions between value creation and value appropriation. 
Purchasing managers from Volkswagen revealed a general mistrust that “suppliers are enjoying 
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high margins at the expense of our profit” (Volkswagen purchasing manager) and hide any cost 
efficiencies they might have realized without sharing them with Volkswagen. The price offered 
is an important supplier selection criterion. However, because the selection occurs before the 
beginning of the series product development process (36 months before series production), the 
actual price at the end of the development usually deviates from the one agreed upon, as 
engineering changes often occur during the development progress for which suppliers need to 
be compensated. Thus, Volkswagen introduced the Global Sourcing practice, whereby an 
additional bidding process with external suppliers is initiated after the development of the part 
has been finished, and series production has started:  
The main purpose of Global Sourcing is not to bring in another supplier but to review 
the prices. Even though we fix the price when contracts are being signed, there are 
many changes to the part during series development because different parts need to be 
adjusted to each other, and there might be engineering changes which were not 
foreseeable at the beginning. These things might skew the price and we need to verify 
whether it is still in line with the market price. (Volkswagen purchasing manager) 
 
The potential decoupling of the product development and series delivery–or value creation 
and value appropriation–phases poses economic risks for suppliers and decreases their trust in 
the collaboration with the customer:  
We know this, we recognize this in a particular project, but you cannot really protect 
yourself against it. In these cases, we would decide strategically and offer such a low 
price that we know the others cannot deal with this. (Key account manager of a 
Volkswagen supplier) 
 Another initiative to help improve the cost structure of suppliers is the so-called Forum 
Material Costs that one Volkswagen purchasing manager described as a “collaborative 
approach” in order to jointly find “innovative solutions with suppliers to help them reduce their 
costs”. For this purpose, Volkswagen has built up a cost analysis department that conducts cost 
analysis workshops with their suppliers. A particular problem with the cost analysis, however, 
is that the carmaker often does not possess actual manufacturing experience with the part:   
This [costs analysis workshop] really is of no use to us because what they calculate as 
potential savings is just pure fantasy. (…) They always assume an ideal process. We 
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have been manufacturing this part for 50 years and we know the costs better than 
Volkswagen, which has never manufactured this part. We know the technical details 
better. We know when we can use standard parts and when not because the technical 
requirements do not allow it. (Key account manager of a Volkswagen supplier) 
 
As a result, there is naturally a high level of distrust and scepticism among suppliers 
regarding the cooperative intentions of the carmaker. Particularly, the cost analysis workshops 
are often seen as a pretence for price re-negotiations by Volkswagen suppliers, as one of them 
remarked sarcastically:  
Yes, they have cost analysis workshops or purchasing price analysis as they call it, and 
they say: “Why don’t you show us your costs in detail? We will have a look at it 
together and we will tell you where you can realize some great savings.” (…) The next 
thing is the cost workshops that are taking place–as is the case in our project at the 
moment–and you will find yourself in the next round of price negotiations! (Key 
account manager of a Volkswagen supplier) 
Consequently, suppliers were generally protective of information on their cost structure and 
more likely to hide any cost reduction effects they may have realized. They are also likely to 
display opportunistic behaviour when reacting to their customer’s request to fill out the cost 
breakdown: “We always do the cost breakdown so that there is a certain fuzziness. If you want 
my honest opinion, the world wants to be cheated and the system needs to be fed, that is the 
brutal reality” (Key account manager of a Volkswagen supplier). 
Toyota and its supplier network. The Toyota case represents almost the opposite to the case of 
Volkswagen. The purchasing manager interviewed at Toyota was very reflective about the 
value creation-appropriation tension that characterises the relationship with suppliers. In this 
context, he stressed the importance of having a good internal power balance between those 
functions that deal with suppliers in this process to buffer this tension:  
The “sanmittai,” the trinity of development, production and purchasing, is important. 
Naturally there is a tension between engineering–that mainly cares about innovation 
and quality—and purchasing—that cares about prices, and the supplier is caught 
somewhere in-between. There should be a good balance in a sense that negotiations 




Supplier selection is usually made by Toyota based on past relationship experiences, which 
implies that there is no bidding process for new projects. Toyota, thus, seems to emphasize 
continuity in collaboration with suppliers within projects and over time. 
Moreover, the price is not negotiated at the beginning of the product development process 
(as it is not the basis for supplier selection) but at the end of the process. This allows Toyota to 
integrate suppliers early in the product development process, so that they are given an 
opportunity to bring in their ideas about how the construction of parts could be improved, but 
there is no fear of an undesirable lock-in, “Some of our suppliers have excellent capabilities in 
terms of technology, quality and cost. We encourage suggestions from such suppliers, 
particularly at an early stage of the development” (Toyota purchasing manager). As a result, 
suppliers perceive themselves as having more freedom to bring their ideas and expertise into 
the development process, and thus increase joint value creation while they express their trust 
that the value created would be appropriated fairly later.  
  While most of the value of a product is predetermined in the product development phase, 
additional value can be created through efficiencies in the series production stage. Hence, 
carmakers have a strong interest in learning about the cost structure of the purchased part and 
request more detailed knowledge from the supplier. One supplier who has previous experience 
with delivering Volkswagen describes a central difference with Toyota regarding carmaker’s 
respect of the supplier’s margin:  
Toyota demands full transparency of our cost structure. It is an open book policy. They 
want to know exactly what each process step costs, have full control, but also give 
advice where we can improve things. Thus, they are always well-informed where we 
might have accumulated some slack. The advantage is, however, when the conditions 
for us change, when material prices go up, when wages go up, that they will 
immediately accept our calculation: ‘I see that steel has become more expensive, so we 
will share the burden with you.’ (Key account manager of a Toyota supplier) 
In general, Toyota’s suppliers saw the advantages of sharing sensitive cost information with 
the carmaker and another interviewed sales manager of a German supplier was deeply 
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impressed by the accuracy with which level costs are being broken down and the in-depth 
manufacturing knowledge behind it:  
Toyota has an in-house development for components that have been outsourced to 80 
or 90%, just for them to get a realistic picture of what the actual costs are for 
manufacturing this part. They know for a specific part that comes out of a specific press, 
with this type of material, with this chamfer, with this specific tact, that this will cost 
this amount of money. They really have these amazing tables with meticulously 
compiled facts. (Sales manager of a Toyota supplier) 
Another reason suppliers were willing to share detailed cost information with the buyer is 
that Toyota was able to provide them with helpful advice on how they could achieve cost 
reductions: “We are always grateful for Toyota’s advice, as it helps us to reduce costs in our 
processes. Toyota is the grandmaster of Lean Production. But they also understand our cost 
reduction potential really well” (Key account manager of a Toyota supplier). 
 BMW and its supplier network. In the past, BMW explicitly collaborated with suppliers 
as one of the five key strategies to sustain themselves against Japanese competitors (Kilper, 
2000: 18). The announcement of the cost-reduction program “Number One” in 2008 has, 
however, undeniably introduced more competitive elements into BMW’s relations with 
suppliers ever since. For example, our interviewed BMW suppliers reported that the 
German carmaker had started to split product development contracts from the actual 
delivery contract. This means that the actual supplier selection for series will be made after 
the development of a part is finished, shortly before tools for series production need to be 
purchased. In extreme cases, this could lead to one supplier developing the part for series 
and another supplier receiving the actual delivery contract for it. Although series 
development will be paid for separately in this case, this approach is not economically 
attractive for suppliers. Asked for a possible reason for this, one German supplier states: 
Competition, for sure. They want to postpone the decision on project awarding as long 
as possible, so that we suppliers can compete against each other for longer. That would 
be my assumption, so purchasing has more chances to iterate negotiations. (Key 
account manager of a BMW supplier) 
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BMW has strengthened its efforts to expand its knowledge of the cost structure of its purchasing 
parts, leading to the building up of a large “cost engineering” department with 200 employees 
within the strategic purchasing division. As a result, suppliers generally had more trust in the 
accuracy of BMW’s price-cutting demands compared to Volkswagen suppliers, as stated by 
one sales managers of who is in charge for both Volkswagen and BMW: “BMW is not just 
cutting costs across the board but they can show us in great detail how much our products are 
allowed to cost.”   
This higher level of perceived accuracy in price calculations could be ascribed to the 
increase of in-house competencies for the manufacturing of critical components:   
Our purchasing department has its own foundry and in-house manufacturing for axle 
transmissions and power trains. This has several advantages. Purchasing managers 
learn about technological relationships and manufacturing and commodity flows. It is 
also a reality check for our cost analytics department to show that their calculations are 
not just pure theory. And we can demonstrate to our suppliers in which areas we can 
be a benchmark for them. (BMW purchasing manager) 
 
As a result, and despite similar supplier management practices, BMW was described as 
more “fair” when it comes to the sharing of realized cost efficiencies: 
Of course it is in our own interest to reduce our costs. But for most cost reducing 
measures we need to inform and obtain approval from our customer and BMW is quite 
fair in sharing the gains with us. Other customers sometimes just claim the benefits 
solely for themselves. (Sales manager of a BMW supplier) 
Nissan and its supplier network. With the announcement of the Nissan Revival Plan (NRP) in 
1999, Nissan escaped from bankruptcy by introducing more competition in its supplier network. 
Before the NRP, Nissan was suffering from over-embeddedness with long-standing suppliers, 
and a lack of tension to encourage suppliers to improve performance continuously. This resulted 
in the complete restructuring of Nissan’s supplier network, including the sale of all but four of 
almost 1,400 affiliated companies and the reorganization of Nissan’s purchasing department. 
While this helped to achieve the desired cost reductions–mostly on the back of suppliers who 
sacrificed their profit margins–Nissan caused extreme damages to supplier trust, which they 
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sought to repair from 2004 on by the strengthening of collaborations with selected suppliers. 
Suppliers first had to qualify for a Component Panel. Sourcing contracts are now restricted to 
suppliers within this panel, which can be interpreted as a means to exclude market competition, 
but maintain network competition, similar to Toyota. Moreover, Nissan is strategically 
segmenting its supplier base–in line with the increase of equity ties–in order to strengthen 
collaboration with four suppliers.  
Nissan practices a single sourcing strategy for a specific purchasing part as part of its Global 
Single Sourcing. This means that the best performing supplier among a group of system 
suppliers is given the chance to deliver parts for all of Nissan’s production locations worldwide. 
In return, however, the supplier is expected to offer competitive pricing and annual cost 
reductions that “exceed the industry-common 3x5 rule” (sales manager of a Nissan supplier) 
(i.e., annual cost reduction of five percent over a period of three years). However, this strategy 
was seen very critically by suppliers for a number of reasons:  
Of course it would be great if we won this order. These are big volumes. But it also 
creates huge risks for suppliers; this time we might win the contract but next time 
Nissan could say: ‘Thank you very much.’ (Sales manager of a Nissan supplier)  
 Despite the network internal restriction of competition at Nissan, Nissan suppliers are 
facing higher uncertainty regarding the continuation of their business with the Japanese 
carmaker. One supplier, in which Nissan increased their equity stakes after the NRP, 
highlighted that being part of Nissan’s supplier network does not grant any privileges in terms 
of future business: “On a superficial level it might seem like a return to [former] relations. 
Nissan did increase its equity shares in our company. They did not increase business with us, 
however. That is an important difference” (Corporate executive of a Nissan supplier).  
Moreover, suppliers seemed generally sceptical whether their efforts to reduce costs would 
be rewarded by their customer: “Even though Nissan is making profits again, they still do not 
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show any goodwill in compensating us for our past efforts to cut costs” (Sales manager of a 
Nissan supplier). 
Cross-case comparison 
With respect to their approaches to managing the paradox of coopetition in their relationships 
with suppliers, we found the most noticeable differences between Toyota and Volkswagen (see 
Figure 2).  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
A comparison of these two approaches reveals that in Volkswagen clearly tries to separate 
competitive phases from cooperative ones in the collaboration with suppliers. Due to this 
splitting approach, however, we found that Volkswagen’s suppliers are more likely to interpret 
cost analysis workshops that were promoted by the carmaker as a means to enhance cooperation 
as competition-inducing practices, which leads them to retain rather than share sensitive cost 
information. By contrast, Toyota does not only involve the supplier at an early stage when value 
creation is determined (i.e., concept development), but does not replace the supplier with a 
competitor at the stage when value is actually appropriated and shared (i.e., series production). 
Toyota’s demonstrated respect for suppliers’ margins allowed suppliers to openly share cost 
information with their customer to jointly identify further cost reduction potentials. This 
encourages long-term relationships in the firm’s supplier network and shapes coopetitive 
tensions in a productive way, which is why we argue that Toyota’s approach comes closest to 
an acceptance approach to the paradox.  
Due to changes in supplier management strategies, the two other cases, BMW and Nissan, 
are more hybrid and dynamic in character and thus harder to assign a particular approach to 
regarding managing paradox. BMW’s approach displays stronger elements of splitting as it 
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started to decouple value creation-phases from value appropriation-phases. Nevertheless, 
suppliers generally showed a higher level of trust in the legitimacy of BMW’s price cutting 
demands and their intention of sharing value with suppliers. Finally, Nissan is an interesting 
case in the sense that it seemingly resembles an accepting approach because of practices like 
the Component Panel and Global Single Sourcing that highlight cooperation with selected 
network suppliers rather than market competition. However, unlike Toyota’s case, Nissan’s 
suppliers displayed a high level of distrust regarding the intentions of their customer to share 
value fairly with them and be loyal to them in future orders. One explanation for this apparent 
perceptual mismatch is the severe price-pressure that Nissan exerts on suppliers that have won 
an order: since only one winning supplier will get to deliver all of Nissan’s global operations, 
the Japanese carmaker can demand that suppliers offer an extremely competitive price in 
exchange for an exclusive collaboration. Yet, this winner-takes-all logic poses huge risks for 
all suppliers who make investments to qualify for a new project at Nissan. Unlike Toyota’s 
suppliers, Nissan’s suppliers cannot expect the continuity of business with their customer, and 
there is fierce supplier competition before and after a project.  
Figure 3 summarizes the identified differences between carmakers' approaches to managing 
the paradox of coopetition, suppliers’ responses, and resulting tension dynamics.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Revisiting our two research questions, we present the main insights from our research in light 
of the supply chain management as well as organizational paradox literatures.  
With regard to our first research question, (1) How do buying firms manage the paradox of 
coopetition in their supplier networks?, we found, in line with previous research on managing 
paradox (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Smith, 2014), that splitting 
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seems to be the most prominent way to handle this paradox in practice in the global automotive 
industry. The separation of contradicting elements in a functional, spatial and/or temporal way 
allows managers to deal with ambiguities that often cause discomfort. While splitting can be an 
effective strategy temporarily, it can have unintended consequences at the level of the inter-
organizational relation, when an integrative mechanism is missing (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 
2009). In such a case, splitting is likely to resolve the paradox in one direction–typically 
resulting in buyer-supplier relations that are characterized by too much rivalry. Collaborative 
practices like concept-competition or cost analysis workshops are perceived as competition-
inducing by suppliers, particularly when the buyer uses them to gain a higher share of the 
margin, as the cases of Volkswagen and Nissan demonstrate.  
The case of Nissan is particularly interesting as it shows that the ostensible exclusion of 
competing suppliers in the network as a result of its Global Single Sourcing does not erase 
competitive tensions. This demonstrates the value of complementing a structural perspective of 
coopetition with a paradox perspective which focuses on processes and practices, reflecting 
past experiences and future expectations of competition. A paradox perspective also sensitizes 
the management of both buyers as well as suppliers for the transitory nature of network 
structures that can change with every new sourcing decision. While most suppliers have 
accepted recurring supplier selection competitions between projects as a normal part of business 
life, paradoxical tensions from anticipated competition will be fierce if the buyer and supplier 
engage in an adversarial, instead of synergistic, relational manner (Nair et al., 2011). The 
experience of Nissan’s suppliers, that their efforts to reduce costs are not positively taken into 
account for upcoming supplier selection decisions, indicates a rather adversarial context, 
despite the strengthening of financial ties of Nissan with its key suppliers.  
Moreover, and again from the paradox perspective, we find that the acceptance approach 
that Toyota follows offers the highest potential for synergistic outcomes of cooperation and 
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competition, which translates into higher cost efficiencies and profit margins. The profit ratios 
of both Toyota and its major suppliers in the period from 2003-2014 were higher on average 
than that of its Japanese and Western rivals (Aoki & Wilhelm, 2017). This can be explained 
with the responses of Toyota’s suppliers who were openly sharing cost information details, as 
they felt that their customer possessed a deeper understanding of the underlying manufacturing 
processes so that they could provide suppliers with valuable cost-reduction suggestions. At the 
same time, however, we saw in the case of BMW that a splitting approach must not necessarily 
result in suboptimal outcomes. Similar to Toyota’s suppliers, BMW’s suppliers responded with 
higher levels of trust that they developed in the accuracy of the cost analysis of their customer 
and its fairness in sharing gains. This leads to our first observation:  
Observation 1: Both splitting and acceptance approaches to managing the paradox of 
coopetition can be successful in terms of avoiding negative tension dynamics when  coopetition 
capabilities at the level of the buying organization are present.  
The importance of such capabilities is also reflected in the answer to our second research 
question, (2) Which coopetition capabilities does the buyer need in order to trigger positive 
responses from suppliers and avoid negative tension dynamics? For both approaches, splitting 
and acceptance, we saw that a pronounced competence of the carmaker to evaluate price and 
cost structures of the supplier can positively influence the tension between value creation and 
value appropriation. The importance of such “evaluative capabilities” for the buying firm has 
been highlighted before in the buyer-supplier relationship literature. For example, Brusoni et al. 
(2001) advocated that firms should know more than they make and should thus broaden their 
technological knowledge base despite their outsourcing of manufacturing activities. 
Component-related expertise helps buying firms to maintain outcome control in terms of 
technological system integration and design quality (Takeishi, 2002; Tiwana & Keil, 2007) 
through the formulation of appropriate quality metrics and levels, making these both strict and 
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achievable for suppliers (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2010). The cases of Toyota and BMW made 
clear that the carmaker’s control of purchased components not only extends beyond quality 
assurance and system integration but also involves the ability to understand the true 
manufacturing cost of each process step. This, in turn, allows Toyota to develop helpful cost 
reduction suggestions for suppliers. It can thus be argued that if suppliers perceive the buyer to 
have a deep-rooted understanding of the component-related manufacturing processes, they 
develop higher competence trust in their customer (Sako, 1992) and accept their customer’s 
improvement suggestions. This leads to our second observation:  
Observation 2: When the buying firm has strong evaluative capabilities, it is better able to 
provide helpful cost improvement suggestions which, in turn, increases the potential for joint 
value creation through the creation of supplier (competence) trust.   
The literature on open book accounting practices has highlighted the one-sided nature of 
the risks that go along with cost data disclosure–especially if it is only the supplier who has to 
provide cost-relevant information–often resulting in the squeezing of the suppliers’ profit 
margin as well as in an unequal share in cost savings (Carr & Ng, 1995; Munday, 1992). 
Naturally, suppliers are resistant to this practice. While the role of the relational context has 
been highlighted as an enabler of open book accounting practices (Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005), 
the specific role of supplier trust has been inconclusive (Möller et al., 2011). Our findings 
indicate that if suppliers have not only competence but also goodwill trust in the intention of 
their carmaker to not pursue its own benefits at the supplier’s expense (Sako 1992), they are 
more likely to share this sensitive information. The repeated notions of “respect for the margin” 
and “fair sharing of gains” that was highlighted by both Toyota and BMW suppliers can be seen 
as an indication for goodwill trust, leading to our third observation:  
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Observation 3: When the buying firm has strong evaluative capabilities, and demonstrates 
its intention for a fair division of value appropriation between both parties, higher levels of 
supplier (goodwill) trust makes open book policies more likely.  
We thus shed light on the functioning of evaluative capabilities by linking them to value 
creation and value appropriation through the development of two types of trust. By this, we also 
provide evidence for a “coopetition capability” at the organization-level that helps to mitigate 
competitive tensions irrespective of which strategy, acceptance or splitting, is chosen.  
Contributions to theory 
Supply chain management scholars, since acknowledging the dark side of collaborative buyer-
supplier relations (e.g., Kim & Choi 2015), have started to embrace the idea of coopetition in 
supplier networks. Coopetition in such networks has mainly been analyzed from a (network) 
structural perspective (Wu and Choi, 2009; Wilhelm, 2011; Mena et al., 2013) in terms of the 
presence and absence of ties between supply chain actors (Pathak et al., 2014). This stream of 
research has sensitized us to the interconnectedness of dyadic or triadic relations that can give 
rise to competitive tensions in supplier networks. By drawing on the emerging paradox theory 
from the field of management and organization studies (cf. Schad et al., 2016), we go beyond 
a structural consideration of coopetition and develop a greater sensitivity to competitive 
tensions: how they are dealt with by buying firms in practice and the resulting dynamics that 
arise when suppliers respond to the buying firm’s management approaches. A paradox 
perspective with its focus on processes and dynamics of response patterns, instead of responses 
to discrete issues (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Smith, 2014; Putnam et al., 2016), fruitfully 
complements the existing structural perspective on coopetition in supplier networks.  
Applying a paradox perspective has also shifted our attention to the importance of 
“coopetition capabilities” (Bengtsson et al., 2016), as the ability to control competitive tensions 
while creating joint value from collaboration. There is recognition among supply chain scholars 
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that coopetition capabilities can evolve into an important relational capability (Li et al., 2011). 
Empirical studies using this concept are scarce, however, and build on an indirect 
operationalization of coopetition capabilities by measuring the strength of cooperation, on the 
one hand, and the degree of constructive conflict, on the other (Li et al., 2011). We offer a more 
concrete conceptualization of what exactly coopetition capabilities entail in a supplier chain 
context by highlighting the importance of evaluative capabilities of the buying firm. Our 
concept of evaluative capabilities resembles and complements the concept of “technical 
capabilities” discussed in the supply chain management field; this term refers to the 
understanding of the science and technology involved in producing and sourcing goods and 
services (Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani et al., 2011). Technical capabilities allow firms to better 
specify sourced materials and components, and have been linked to the buyer’s ability to 
efficiently coordinate supply chains (Parmigiani et al., 2011). Technical capabilities also help 
buyers to share knowledge with suppliers and facilitate supplier integration in the buyer’s 
product development (Petersen et al., 2005). Thus, while technical capabilities allow buyers to 
build up collaborative relationships with suppliers in order to enhance joint value creation, 
evaluative capabilities also enable the buyer to understand supplier’s cost structures. Thus, 
evaluative capabilities not only contribute to the value creation but also value appropriation 
aspects of the buyer-supplier relationship. When the buyer demonstrates its understanding of 
actual manufacturing costs of purchased parts and shows, in addition, goodwill and fairness in 
the process, this helps, in turn, to enhance supplier trust. In line with previous studies that 
highlight the importance of not only buyer trust, but also supplier trust for creating value in 
buyer-supplier relations (Johnston et al., 2004) we find that evaluative capabilities of the buyer 
can facilitate open book practices and joint cost reductions (i.e., value creation), and control the 
division of value appropriation between partners.  
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Our study not only contributes to the supply chain literature but also to research on 
managing paradoxes more generally. By identifying a buying firm’s evaluative capabilities, we 
highlight the importance of understanding “coopetition capability” as an organizational 
capability (Collis, 1994) for managing supply chains. So far, coopetition capability has mainly 
been depicted as a manager’s (Lewis, 2000; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014) or employee’s (Stadtler & 
Van Wassenhove, 2016) cognitive ability to think paradoxically. Recent contributions highlight 
the importance to understand capabilities at different levels for managing coopetition: 
Organizational capabilities come into play at the formation stage of the paradoxical relationship 
and can help to structure cooperation and competition in a balanced way, while individual 
capabilities of managers help to regulate felt tensions that result from an existing paradox (see 
also Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2017). Thus, capabilities at different levels of the organization 
are necessary to effectively manage the paradox of coopetition.  
Managerial implications 
We have shown that accepting and splitting approaches can both be viable strategies for 
managing the paradox of coopetition in supplier networks, but both require strong coopetitive 
and, in particular, evaluative capabilities of the buying firm. The cases of Toyota and BMW 
indicate the importance of building up–or preserving–residual in-house development and 
manufacturing capabilities for outsourced parts in order to maintain evaluative capabilities. 
Interestingly, Toyota’s and BMW’s in-house development and manufacturing of parts such as 
powertrain, steering, suspension, brake, wheel and tire, exterior, interior, and body electric 
components that other carmakers have typically outsourced fully are not an attempt to start 
competing with suppliers for vertical integration to make and buy as in “concurrent sourcing” 
(Parmigiani, 2007), but paradoxically are a necessary condition for the cooperative way of 
sharing information on costs. Evaluative capabilities enable a “reality check” of purchasing 
prices, as a BMW manager puts it, and prevent the distortion of supplier trust through unrealistic 
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price cutting demands. This is exemplified through Volkswagen’s mere reliance on market 
mechanisms as a means to check the adequateness of prices.  
Moreover, recent research has pointed out that buying firms deal with potential problems 
of over-embeddedness with suppliers by avoiding the concentration of exchange in the hands 
of a few suppliers, even though this means foregoing the chance of creating maximum 
appropriable value with a supplier (Elfenbein and Zenger, 2017). Thus, the uncertainties of the 
division of appropriable value leads buyers to tend to choose a “larger share of a smaller pie” 
by distributing rather than focusing their transactions. Thus, rather than focusing on structural 
metrics of the supplier network in terms of the number of suppliers selected, buyers might be 
better advised to invest in their coopetition capabilities and respective practices in order to 
create maximum appropriable value with selected suppliers and reduce uncertainties about how 
value will be appropriated.  
Limitations and outlook  
The coopetition paradox can take many forms. We have focused on the most prominent one, 
the one between value creation and value appropriation (e.g., Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; 
Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Ritala & Tidström, 2014). Thereby, we defined value 
creation quite narrowly in terms of achieved cost efficiencies in product development or 
manufacturing, which might be a reflection of the high market saturation and fierce global 
competition that the automotive industry is facing. Other competitive tensions–like the fight for 
vertical integration between carmaker and suppliers, or intellectual property rights after joint 
product development–surfaced peripherally but were beyond the scope of our study. These and 
other possible variations of coopetition deserve further investigation within and beyond the 
context of the automotive industry.  
Furthermore, our analysis of coopetition was restricted to the level of buying firms and their 
first-tier suppliers. However, research in coopetition in supply networks indicates that there can 
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be “spillovers” of competitive tensions to the second-tier suppliers (Pathak et al., 2014). A 
single decision of a buyer to source from a particular supplier can lead to a cascading set of 
dissolutions of ties and the creation of new structural holes in the network. In this context, it 
would be interesting to study how coopetition evolves in multi-tier structures (Mena et al., 
2013) and how open book accounting practices, like the ones we describe in our study, can be 
also used to manage the interdependences within entire supply chains, including second- and 
third-tier suppliers (see also Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005).  
Finally, the paradox lens has proven to be a valuable theoretical lens to gain new insights 
on the management of coopetition as one of the most central tensions in supplier networks. 
While some supply chain scholars have highlighted paradoxical thinking as a general means to 
develop better and more pluralistic theory (Rindova, 2011; Matthews et al., 2016), we still see 
a large potential to apply paradox theory on contradicting demands other than coopetition that 
characterize supply chains. For example, meeting sustainability and business aims 
simultaneously is commonly considered a trade-off (Hahn et al., 2010; Wu & Pagell, 2011; 
Busse, 2016), which is often resolved in favour of business aims in practice. Applying a paradox 
lens to this highly contemporary challenge could help to overcome the dominant instrumental 
perspective and simplifying ‘win-win’-thinking in our field (see also Montabon et al., 2016). 
Moreover, such a lens offers a novel and more emphatic perspective on the struggles of those 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 






















BMW Germany  1 PM   4  SM, KAM 
Volkswagen Germany  4 PM 13  SM, KAM, 
PJM 
Toyota Japan  5 PM 19 CE, SM, 
KAM, PJM 
Nissan Japan  1 PM 11  CE, SM, PJM 
Total   11  47  
Abbreviation: CE: Corporate Executive, PM: Purchasing manager, SM: Sales manager, KAM: Key account 
manager, PJM: Project manager 
Note: We decided not to state what products suppliers mainly deliver in order to ensure their anonymity. In cases 
where respondents were in charge of more than one customer in their current position, the interview was 
double-counted and assigned to both respective carmaker cases. The total number of double-counted 
interviews included in the sample is eight.  
 
Table 1: List of interviews 
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Toyota:	Simultaneous cooperation and competition across all	stages
BMW:	Sequential cooperation and competition
Nissan:	Cooperation within projects but	fierce competiton between projects




Figure 3: Carmakers’ approaches to managing the paradox of vertical coopetition, suppliers’ responses 
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A.1. Buyer’s interview instrument  
 
A.1.1. General information  
a) Career, current department, position and job description. 
b) Organization of the purchasing division.  
c) Responsible parts / sourcing strategy for this part (single, dual, multiple).  
 
A.1.2. Sourcing process  
a) Please describe your company’s general approach to supplier management. 
b) Please describe the process of contract awarding.  
c) When do suppliers typically get involved in the process? 
d) How many suppliers do you request for quotations?  
e) How do you select suppliers? What are the most important criteria for supplier selection?  
f) Who is involved in the selection at your organization? Which functions are represented?  
g) Do you make use on online auction methods?  
h) How are prices negotiated? When is the price contractually fixed?  
i) How do you determine whether the price you agree on is adequate?  
j) At which point in time are contracts awarded? For how long are contracts awarded?  
k) How do changes of the specifications during product development affect prices?  
 
A.1.3. Cooperation 
a) How long have you been working together with this particular supplier? How would you describe the 
relationship? Where there any changes?  
b) Do you invest in this supplier (e.g. supplier development programs)?  
c) What kind of information do you exchange with suppliers? Are you satisfied with the current level of 
information exchange?  
d) Do you pursue joint development programs for new technologies and products? Please describe the 
process of supplier involvement in product development.  
e) Do you pursue joint efficiency programs?  
f) What kind of support to you provide to suppliers?  
g) Who is paying for dies and tools of suppliers? 
h) Are you compensating suppliers for lower than forecasted orders or changes of material prices?  
 
¶ A.1.4. Competition  
a) How many suppliers are available on the market for your sourcing part?  
b) Are you concerned about dependencies on single suppliers? Did this occur in the past? How do you 
prevent this?  
c) Do you actively try to enforce competition between your suppliers? Please provide an example. 
d) How do you ensure that purchasing prices are aligned with market prices? 
e) Do you evaluate your supplier’s performance on a regular basis? Based on which criteria? How does 
this evaluation affect contract awarding?  
f) How do you deal with suppliers who (temporarily) cannot meet your price demands?  
g) Do you possess a good understanding of suppliers’ pricing policies? Do you demand insights on their 
cost calculations? How do suppliers respond to your demands?  
h) How often are prices renegotiated? Do you operate with fixed price reduction targets? How are these 
determined?  
i) Do you support your suppliers in reducing cost reduction targets? Can you describe these initiatives?  
j) Do you take suppliers’ efforts to meet your cost reduction demands positively into account for the 
upcoming sourcing decision?  
k) Are there any competitive tensions in the collaboration with a specific supplier? When do you perceive 
these tensions most strongly?  
l) Do you sometimes feel that the price pressure you exert on suppliers affects your cooperation with this 
supplier? Can you provide an example?  






A.2. Supplier’s interview instrument  
¶  
A.2.1. General information  
a) Career, current department, position and job description. 
b) Organization of the sales division.  
c) Responsible part and customer 
 
A.2.2. Sourcing process  
a) Please describe your customers’ general approach to supplier management. Do you feel that your 
customer actively tries to enforce cooperation or competition or even both?   
b) Please describe your customer’s sourcing strategy (i.e. single, dual, parallel, multiple) for the part you 
manufacture.   
c) Please describe a typical sourcing process for this part.   
d) At which stage do you typically get involved in the process? 
e) How many suppliers does your customer request for quotations?  
f) What do you think are important criteria for winning a contract with your customer? Which parties are 
involved from the customer’s side?   
g) How are prices negotiated? When is the price contractually fixed? 
h) What are the regulations for tools and dies?  
i) At which point in time are contracts awarded? For how long are contracts awarded?  
j) Does the contract include a market-price clause? Which clauses do you consider problematic and how 
do you deal with them?  
k) How do changes of the specifications during product development affect prices later?  
 
A.2.3. Cooperation 
a) How long have you been working together with this particular customer? How would you describe the 
relationship? Where there any changes?  
b) Does your customer provide any form of assistance (e.g. supplier development programs)? Are there 
other forms of support given? 
c) What kind of information do you exchange with the customer? Are you satisfied with the current level 
of information exchange?  
d) Do you pursue joint development programs for new technologies and products? How does the customer 
involve you in its product development process?  
e) Do you pursue joint efficiency programs with the customer?  
f) Does your customer compensate you for lower than forecasted orders or changes of material prices?  
 
¶ A.2.4. Competition  
a) Who are your competitors for this particular part?  
b) Does your rival also have business relationships with your customer?  
c) For your customer, what do you think makes a supplier competitive?  
d) At which moment do you feel competitive moments most strongly? Do you perceive these competitive 
moments as productive or destructive?  
e) Do you think that your customer is actively enforcing competition between suppliers? How do you 
respond to that?  
f) Does your customer rank supplier’s performance on a regular basis? Based on which criteria? How does 
this evaluation affect contract awarding?  
g) Are there supplier performance rankings? How credible are they to you?  
h) Does your customer practice an open book policy? How do you respond to these demands?  
i) How often are prices renegotiated? Does your customer set annual price reduction targets?  
j) Do you receive any support from your customer for reducing costs?  
k) Are your efforts to meet reduction demands positively taken into account for future business?  
l) What are typical conflicts that occur with this customer? How are they resolved?  






TABLE A2: Validity and reliability issues addressed throughout the course of our researcha 
 
  Research Phase 
Reliability/Validity   Criterion Design Case Selection Data Gathering Data Analysis 
Reliability  
(demonstrating that the operations 
can be repeated, with the same 
results) 
§ Develop case study protocol 
§ Development and utilization of 
case study database 
§ Selection based on publicly available 
supplier satisfaction rankings (Automotive 
News Annual Supplier Satisfaction 
Ranking, Planning Perspectives) 
§ Semi-structured interview 
guidelines  § Involvement of authors who have not 
been in the field gathering the data 
§ Coding according to the approach of 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
Internal Validity  
(establishing a causal relationship, 
whereby certain conditions are 
shown to lead to other conditions, 
as distinguished from spurious 
relationships) 
 
§ Thorough review of previous 
literature, and a theoretical 
framework (i.e., approaches of 
managing paradox) 
 
§ Sampling criteria recorded in case study 
protocol 
§ Multiple informants 
§ Recording of factors that might lead 
to alternative explanations 
 
§ Pattern matching within and among 
cases 
§ Triangulation of questionnaire, semi-
structured interview and secondary 
data 
Construct Validity 
(establishing correct operational 
measures for the concepts being 
studied) 
§ Adoption of questions from 
previous research in the field of 
buyer supplier relations and 
coopetition theory 
§ N/A § Multiple sources of information 
§ Recording of interviews to improve 
completeness 
§ Confidentiality agreements  
§ Data triangulation 
§ Validation of analysis through 
selected respondents and clarification 
of data analysis 
External Validity 
(establishing a domain in which the 
study’s findings can be generalized) 
 
§ N/A § Theoretical sampling § Clear description of case firms’ 
context and situation 
 
§ Context based approach  
§ Comprehensive intra-case analysis 
§ Analytical generalization based on 
patterns 
 
a based on Yin (2014); Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki (2008) 
 
